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Are retirement savings sufficient to finance a good pension income? This highly uncertain and 
subjective dimension of life cycle decision making is assessed among married working 
individuals using an identical survey distributed to Dutch and American workers in 2007. 
Despite marked differences in expected and needed pension replacement rates - where the 
Dutch replacement rates are systematically higher than the American rates - the perceived 
savings adequacy is more or less the same across Dutch and American workers. Moreover, 
individuals’ perceived savings adequacy was found to be influenced by the three groups of 
factors: institutional forces, social forces and psychological dispositions. This study shows 
that differences in the mind set of American workers plays a far larger role in explaining 
differences in perceptions of savings adequacy than it does in the Netherlands. 
 
* This paper was written while Hershey was affiliated as a visiting fellow during 2007/2008 at 
the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies in Wassenaar.   1
1. Introduction 
Are the lifetime savings people make sufficient to provide them with a comfortable pension 
income? To answer to this question, one must address a wide range of issues including the 
institutional setting in which savings take place, the level of uncertainty surrounding the life 
course in terms of work, income and health dynamics, and the subjective assessment of what 
constitutes a ‘comfortable’ or ‘good’ pension income (Engen et al.,1999; Skinner, 2007; and 
Bovenberg  et al., 2007). The latter is often framed as a comparison between ones’ post-
retirement income relative to pre-retirement standards, or to some other indicator of the 
poverty threshold (cf. Haveman et al. 2007). In the present study, we analyze perceptions of 
the pension savings adequacy of Dutch and American workers, as well as the institutional, 
social and psychological forces that affect them. 
  There is increasing recognition that insights from the fields of behavioral economics 
and finance could help to inform pension fund designers who seek to offer saving programs 
and institutions to individuals who act rationally, but within certain limited bounds (cf. 
Benartzi and Thaler, 2007; Shiller, 2005). Policy issues surrounding pension design gain 
particular importance in light of recent population ageing dynamics and studies that suggest a 
generation of soon-to-retire workers will be poorly prepared to meet their financial 
obligations. Studies by Bernheim (1993, 1997) suggest that American baby boomers are 
saving just one-third of what they need in order to retire comfortably. A more recent study by 
Munnell et al. (2007) revealed that 43 percent of American households are at risk of a 
substantial income decline upon entering retirement. To prepare the American pension system 
for the future consequences brought about by an aging population, reforms have been 
implemented in which the responsibility for retirement saving is shifted from employers and 
the government to the individual worker. Pension funds in the U.S. are in the process of 
undergoing finance reforms, as witnessed by the massive shift over the past two decades from 
defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) plans. This shift has not gone unnoticed by 
American workers, however. According to Helman et al. (2007), nearly half of individuals 
surveyed indicated that the shift from DB to DC plans left them less confident in their level of 
future benefits. Their level of confidence regarding the adequacy of their pension, however, 
remained remarkably high, with 70 percent feeling ‘confident’ they would have enough 
money to live comfortably throughout their retirement years. 
Striking differences of opinion are often found between experts and lay persons 
regarding what constitutes an adequate level of retirement savings. The fact that this disparity   2
exists serves to underscore the importance of examining individuals’ perceptions of savings 
adequacy and their determinants. This is an issue that has received relatively little attention in 
the literature to date. Kemp, Rosenthal, and Denton (2005) have argued that it is critical to tap 
subjective (in addition to strictly objective) indicators of financial planning for late life, 
because it is the former that structures individuals’ perceptions of financially-related 
opportunities and constraints and triggers savings behavior. 
For quite some time, economists have relied on the lessons derived from standard 
neoclassical models of lifetime consumption. Two implicit assumptions made in these models 
are that individuals have the cognitive ability to solve intertemporal maximization problems 
independently, and they have sufficient willpower and skills to carry out optimal plans. There 
is, however, clear evidence that many people lack the ability to delay gratification and 
exercise self-control, both of which are important determinants of saving behavior (Thaler, 
1994). Thaler states that “if we are to understand why people are saving so little and are to 
make helpful recommendations as to how to get people to save more, then we have to 
incorporate more of the psychology of savings into our economic models (1994, p.186).”  In 
this article we take the position that retirement savings decisions and perceptions of savings 
adequacy are linked to: (a) the institutional setting in which one lives and works, (b) social 
forces that may or may not stimulate one to save, and (c) psychological dispositions that may 
predispose one to plan and save for retirement. Whereas many studies have documented the 
importance of psychological forces in relation to retirement savings (for an overview see 
Mitchell and Utkus, 2004), few have examined the impact social forces have on saving, and 
nearly none have considered the role of public and occupational pensions in relation to saving 
adequacy. 
This proposed extension to behavioral economic models may have important 
ramifications, because it could help explain why it is people fail make optimal use of 
available savings and investments opportunities. For instance, individuals have demonstrated 
less than full participation in savings programs, their savings contributions are often 
inadequate, they routinely fail to diversify their investments, overinvest in company stock, 
and fail to rebalance their portfolio at different points in their lives (Munnell and Sunden, 
2006). 
An international perspective on perceptions of savings adequacy should be particularly 
helpful in terms of understanding how different pension institutions affect private savings 
practices. Pension experts sometimes look with envy to the Dutch pension system, in which 
enrollment is automatic, pension replacement rates are high (cf., OECD, 2007), and pension   3
funds offer low transaction costs in providing an adequate pension. One way such low 
pension financing transaction costs can be attained is by generating economies of scale. This 
is achieved by making pension savings mandatory. The pension guru Ambachtsheer (2007) 
goes so far as to make the claim that “Holland is currently the number one pension country in 
the world” (p. 43). However, it is unclear how reforms toward mandatory retirement savings 
would interact with (or conflict with) individual dispositions to plan and save for retirement. It 
is also unclear how reforms aimed at increasing individual saving responsibility would 
interact with the social and psychological forces that shape workers savings decisions, as well 
as their perceptions of savings adequacy. Reforms that fail to take into account social and 
psychological influences run the risk of decreasing savings rates rather than stimulating them, 
as intended. For instance, the introduction of mandatory savings programs might have the 
effect of reducing one’s future orientation when it comes to retirement, thus, not just 
adversely affecting private pension savings but also other long term investments, such as for 
education or health care. The reverse effect could also occur if, for instance, a decrease in the 
collective responsibility for retirement savings is not compensated for at the individual level 
by an increase in private savings. 
This article studies differences in perceived savings adequacy among Dutch and 
American workers using comparable samples of individuals drawn from the two countries. 
For the purposes of this investigation, savings adequacy was conceptualized in two 
qualitatively different ways. First, we measured perceived savings adequacy using a set of 
questions designed to elicit individuals’ subjective perceptions of the construct. Perceived 
savings adequacy, in this instance, is assumed to be the outcome of an evaluation that 
compares one’s expected retirement income with the income level believed to be required in 
order to live comfortably. As a second measure of savings adequacy, we used individuals’ 
best estimate of their expected retirement income replacement rate. Examining individuals’ 
perceptions of savings adequacy represents an important extension of previous work, which 
has generally relied on objective measures of retirement saving. Most economic studies have 
used either the gap between actual wealth holdings and an optimal wealth path in order to 
measure the adequacy of one’s savings (cf. Engen et. al., 1999, Scholtz et al., 2006), or the 
divergence between actual pension income levels and some benchmark income standard. The 
present study is designed to complement these other types of studies and is, to the best of our 
knowledge, the first to simultaneously investigate perceived savings adequacy and self-
reported replacement rates. Examining both types of measures should enable us to assess the 
extent to which perceptions of savings adequacy are linked to more objective indicators, such   4
as one’s anticipated replacement rate. Simply stated, our goal is to explore the extent to which 
perceptions of savings adequacy mirror actual future resource needs, with the latter being 
based on an estimate of one’s expected replacement rate. 
This paper is structured along the following lines. First, in order to provide a sufficient 
conceptual backdrop for the investigation, we review the characteristics of the American and 
Dutch pension systems, with a particular emphasis on differences in saving rates across 
countries (section 2). In section 3 we elaborate on some of the factors we believe might affect 
individuals’ perceptions of savings adequacy. Section 4 contains details regarding the way the 
data were collected and the methodology that was used. In section 5, a number of theoretical 
predictions regarding savings adequacy and replacement rates are tested, and we examine 
perceived savings adequacy estimates in relation to the gap between expected and needed 
replacement rates. Section 6 contains a summary and discussion, with a particular emphasis 
on possible policy implications.  
 
2. Two Pension Cultures 
2.1 Different pension institutions 
Old age pension programs traditionally have two main objectives. The first is an insurance 
function: to help workers maintain an adequate standard of living during retirement by 
replacing income lost from the cessation of work. The second aim is to redistribute income 
toward low-income pensioners in order to prevent destitution in old age. Pension programs in 
countries around the world differ widely with respect to how these two objectives are 
balanced (OECD, 2007; World Bank, 1994), which can clearly be seen by comparing the 
pension and retirement systems in the U.S. and the Netherlands. 
The Dutch pension system consists of two main tiers, a flat-rate public pension scheme 
(the so-called old-aged pension law or AOW, comparable to what is commonly referred to as 
“social security” in the U.S.) and earnings-related occupational plans (often referred to in the 
U.S. as “employer pensions”). Although Dutch employers are not required to offer pension 
schemes to their employees, the force of collective wage agreements is strong in the 
Netherlands and 91 percent of employees are covered by at least some form of occupational 
pension. The overwhelming majority of occupational pension contracts — 96 percent of all 
employees in 2006 — of are of the DB type. With DB plans, employees can count on a 
defined level of retirement income based on a computation that uses their salary and years of 
service (often up to a maximum of 70 percent of their average gross salary). After-tax 
replacement rates are usually substantially higher due to lower marginal tax rates in   5
retirement. For example, a pre-tax replacement rate of 70 percent is tantamount to an after tax 
replacement rate that exceeds 85 percent (Alessie and Kapteyn, 2001). Nearly 80 percent of 
occupational pension premiums are paid for by the employer; the remainder is paid for by the 
employee. Post-retirement indexing of benefits is the rule, as virtually all DB pension 
contracts offer conditional indexation for cost-of-living increases. Indexation depends to a 
large extent on the level of reserves, which are monitored by the Dutch central bank. Pension 
assets should be normally around 130 percent of the pension liabilities. DC plans—in which 
the amount of one’s pension income depends on the specific amount of pension premiums 
paid—are clearly not favored in the Netherlands. Only four percent of Dutch workers have a 
DC pension plan. 
In addition to these two tiers, there is a third tier—voluntary retirement savings—
which until the 1990s played a negligible role for Dutch households. Somewhat recently 
however, voluntary arrangements have begun to emerge in which individuals can enter into 
private pension arrangements with an insurance company to “top off” their retirement income. 
These private savings plans are subsidized by the state to cover income shortfalls in old age 
(i.e., for those with an income replacement rate of less than 70 percent). The role of retirement 
annuities is also becoming more popular among those who seek early retirement. 
Due to the mandatory character of the Dutch pension system, a relatively small 
number of older individuals are poorly supported in retirement. In fact, in 2003 only six 
percent of older individuals were living at or below the poverty level. Among Dutch citizens, 
the low-income elderly are over-represented by single women who worked at part-time jobs 
before retiring, and first generation immigrants who failed to accumulate sufficient public 
pension rights before leaving the workforce. 
The structure of the American retirement financing system also consists of three tiers. 
First, there is the social security program (also known as OASDI), which is a means tested 
scheme designed to provide an income “safety net” for retirees. For approximately 20 percent 
of Americans of 65 years and older, social security represents their only stream of income 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2005). The second tier consists of employer-sponsored 
occupational pensions. In contrast to the Netherlands, American employers are not required to 
provide pension benefits for their employees. Among those employers that do offer pension 
contracts, they are not required to cover all of their employees (e.g., low income and part-time 
workers may be excluded from coverage). Employers often require a minimum tenure period 
before an employee can participate in a pension plan, and a vesting period is routinely applied 
that limits an employee’s access to funds for a pre-specified period of time (e.g., 10 years). In   6
years past most Americans were covered by DB pension plans. Since 1997, however, the 
number of individuals who participate in DC programs has outnumbered those who 
participate in DB plans. In fact, as of 2004 53 percent of the full-time employees in the U.S. 
have a pension plan which is defined in terms of a worker’s level of contributions, whereas 34 
percent has a defined benefit plan (Social Security Administration, 2006). The most common 
type of DC program is a 401(k) plan (named for the section in which it is described in the 
Internal Revenue Service code), in which workers make voluntary saving and investment 
choices, encouraged by federal tax benefits and employer matching contributions. 
The third pillar of the U.S. pension system—voluntary saving arrangements—are 
made up of private saving instruments such as annuities and other forms of personal 
investments. This pillar is far more important in the United States compared to that of the 
Netherlands. According to Börsch-Supan (1998) 21 percent of Americans’ pension income 
comes from privately saved and accumulated wealth, whereas in the Netherlands, the 
corresponding figure is only 4 percent (see also OECD, 2001). 
To highlight the main differences across countries, in the Netherlands a host of 
individual risks and responsibilities are carried and organized at a collective level. Public 
pension is organized through the AOW (Old Age Pensioners’ Law) and is financed by a 
payroll tax on income up to a certain level. Public pension premiums are de facto income 
taxes. Moreover, supplementary pension premiums have a mandatory character. 
In the United States, the burden of risk and responsibility for retirement saving is 
shouldered by the individual worker.  Pension plans often have a voluntary character, 
although many employers make significant contributions to employee pensions, and outcomes 
are highly uncertain as most pensions rely on DC contracts. Besides pensions and personal 
savings, older American adults can rely on social security benefits, but this safety net is far 
less than what the Dutch state pension system offers. 
 
2.2 Different saving rates 
The differences between the two countries are not only visible at the level of institutional 
design, but also with respect to individual savings performance. Of course, savings are 
generated not solely for retirement purposes, but the aggregate savings trends in the two 
countries (see Figures 1 and 2) make it is quite clear that the personal savings rate has fallen 
on both sides of the Atlantic since the 1980s. In the Netherlands, however, mandatory savings 
schemes offer quite a strong counterweight to the extremely low rate of discretionary saving. 
From 2006 onward, the average saving rate in the U.S. has hovered around zero, and in 2005   7
it dipped below zero for the first time since 1933. Until the early 1980s, the average savings 
rate had been 8 to 10 percent of personal disposable income, but it has steadily dropped since 
that time. Of course, measuring savings rates is a task fraught with conceptual and statistical 
difficulties, but whichever measure one chooses to use, the extremely low personal savings 
rate is clear and unambiguous (Reinsdorf, 2007). The personal savings rate becomes even 
lower if DC and DB pension plans are excluded from consideration, and available figures 
suggest that pension contributions and private savings (excluding those contributions) very 
much move in tandem. Of course, the aggregate savings rate of zero may represent a process 
of saving and dissaving of equal force by different cohorts of individuals, but considering the 
fact that the cohort of working individuals outranks the cohort of retirees, this possibility is 
not very likely. What it may very well suggest is that at an aggregate level, the U.S. is facing a 
true savings crisis. 
 
FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE 
 
The same downward trend in personal savings can be seen in the Netherlands, where 
discretionary savings are clearly negative.  That is, Dutch consumers over the past few years 
have become net borrowers—but with a mandatory savings rate of 9 to 10 percent, the 
aggregate personal savings rate still works out to be positive at 6 to 7 percent. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to disentangle the nature of personal savings 
developments over time. However, the data shown in Figures 1 and 2 do suggest that 
mandatory retirement savings programs in the Netherlands offer a counterforce that helps to 
stabilize pension savings over the business cycle. The puzzling issue regarding retirement 
income security in the U.S., of course, is why private savings contributions are so hard to 
trigger. One possible explanation may have to do with the fact that people feel their existing 
savings will be sufficient. 
 
3. Theoretical background 
The most common framework used to explain and assess the development of public and 
private savings is the lifecycle consumption model, designed and developed by Ando and 
Modigliani (1963), and Samuelson (1958). Two tacit assumptions made in these standard 
neoclassical models of lifetime consumption are that: (1) people have the cognitive ability to 
solve intertemporal maximization problems independently, and (2) people have sufficient 
willpower and skills to carry out optimal plans. It is further assumed that at a very basic level,   8
institutions do not matter. The characteristics of public and privately designed savings plans 
are inherently transparent, which effectively neutralize fiscal policy choices or other 
collective savings choices. In short, the life-cycle model of savings offers a handsome starting 
point to think about retirement savings, but it tends to neglect three inextricable elements of 
private savings decisions: 
•  Institutional forces: the fact that individual saving decisions are shaped by the quality and 
design of pension institutions; 
•  Social forces: the fact that individual saving decisions are shaped by the social context in 
which they are made; 
•  Psychological dispositions: the fact that individual saving decisions are affected by one’s 
cognitive capabilities, the ability to plan over time, and the perseverance required to carry 
out those long range plans. 
We will discuss each of these three elements in some detail, below. 
 
Pension Institutions 
The institutional design of a pension system is sure to have a significant impact on 
individuals’ retirement decisions. At the most basic level, anyone who saves for the future is 
putting their trust in a system that will serve an insurance function by protecting property 
rights over time. Or as Hyde et al. (2007, p. 57) state: “Trust reduces complexity, because it 
enables people to transfer responsibilities for activities that they themselves are not 
sufficiently competent to undertake”. The most rational decision, if one is lacking in pension 
knowledge or the willpower to see a plan through to its completion, is to outsource one’s 
investment and management decisions to a financial intermediary. Evaluating the adequacy of 
one’s savings under these circumstances boils down to the level of trust individuals have in 
their financial intermediaries, or in the institutions that govern retirement savings. This issue 
of trust comes into play among all three pillars of the retirement financing system. First, there 
needs to be a level of trust in the state, not only as provider of public pensions, but also as 
guardian of the public interest who regulates the pension and insurance industry. Second, trust 
lies with the pension funds which offer insurance contracts, and those who manage them. And 
finally, with respect to personal savings, there need be trust in private intermediaries like 
banks and insurance companies who offer pension insurance products and savings accounts. 
What determines one’s level of trust in each of these institutions is a more difficult question to 
answer, but it is generally accepted that past performance and expectations of future conduct 
will be in accordance with the reputation these institutions have previously come to establish.    9
Appropriate regulatory guidelines, prudent oversight and a track record of no bankruptcies or 
bank failures are all part of an institutional setting that serves to generates trust. Returning to 
the present investigation, this brings us to formulate the institutional trust hypothesis.  Simply 
stated, this hypothesis suggests that higher levels of trust in the prevailing pension institutions 
will be associated with higher levels of perceived savings adequacy. 
 
Social Forces 
With regard to the social forces that may influence savings decisions, we distinguish between 
two different, yet related, forms of social support. First, we acknowledge that individuals’ 
decisions are often influenced the members of one’s social network (spouses, colleagues, 
friends) by providing social norm cues regarding the “right” course of action. It is widely 
acknowledged that retirement decision making is a household affair, and among older adults, 
spousal support for retirement increases the likelihood of an early exit from the workforce 
(Henkens, 1999). Spousal influences may also be apparent much earlier in the life course, for 
instance with regard to retirement saving decisions. For example, a spouse may encourage a 
conscientious program of retirement saving contributions in order to ensure a comfortable 
standard of living in old age. Dufflo and Saez (2002) recently showed that peer effects also 
have an important influence on workers’ savings decisions. As such, we propose the social 
support hypothesis. That is, the stronger the support from spouses, friends and colleagues for 
saving for retirement, the more likely workers will save and consequently the more likely 
workers will perceive their pension savings as adequate. 
Early parental socialization processes constitute a second social mechanism by which 
workers are believed to be influenced to save. This complex form of intergenerational 
socialization involves parents modeling adaptive behaviors for their children to observe 
(Bandura and Mischel, 1965), thereby providing not only guidance, but a basis for the 
development of habit formation. In short, parents who have conscientiously saved for their 
own retirement serve as role models for their children. In fact, Bernheim et al. (2001) found 
that those who were encouraged to save as children saved more as adults than individuals who 
had not received similar encouragement. Furthermore, a recent study by Webley and Nyhus 
(2006) showed that features of economic socialization (such as discussing financial matters 
with parents) not only had an impact on children’s economic behavior, but on their economic 
behavior in adulthood as well. Accordingly, in the present study we plan to test the 
socialization hypothesis. Specifically, exposure to positive role models and adaptive financial 
learning experiences during childhood should have a positive effect on retirement savings,   10
thereby increasing the likelihood the individual will perceive high levels of savings adequacy. 
 
Psychological Dispositions 
The third group of factors believed to influence retirement savings decisions and perceptions 
of savings adequacy involve individuals’ psychological disposition to save. Within the same 
institutional or household context, individuals saving practices may differ due to differences 
in the skills, attitudes and abilities required for successful financial planning. Three different 
psychological dispositions are assumed to be particularly important when it comes to 
implementing a program of retirement savings: one’s future time perspective, one’s level of 
financial knowledge, and the extent to which one engages in financial planning activities. We 
elaborate on these factors below. 
Future time perspective is a psychological dimension that indicates the extent to which 
individuals focus on the future, as opposed to the past or the present. Conceived of by 
psychologists as a personality trait, one’s time orientation has, in a number of studies, been 
shown to have either a direct or indirect influence on planning and saving (cf., Burtless, 2006; 
Hershey et al., 2007; Lusardi, 1999). Although orientation to time has been conceptualized in 
a variety of ways (Seijts, 1998), in the present study future time perspective is viewed as how 
far into the future an individual looks when making decisions about his or her life course. 
There is some evidence to suggest that this form of future orientation may increase over the 
course of the adult lifespan (Padawer et al., 2007). We predict that individuals with higher 
future time perspectives will report having higher levels of perceived savings adequacy (i.e., 
the future time hypothesis). 
The second psychological dimension involves one’s self-reported level of financial 
knowledge. One of most often identified cognitive predictors of planning and saving is one’s 
level of financial knowledge. High-knowledge individuals have consistently been shown to 
plan and save more than their low-knowledge counterparts (Chan and Stevens, 2003; Ekerdt 
and Hackney, 2002; Grable and Lytton, 1997). Mitchell and Moore (1998) concluded that 
individuals often fail to plan for retirement because they lack sufficient domain-specific 
knowledge. Financial knowledge, which has been demonstrated to increase as a function of 
both formal interventions and hands-on investing experience (Bernheim et al., 1997), has been 
shown to be an excellent predictor of asset accumulations. Findings on the relationship 
between financial literacy and age in adulthood have been equivocal, with some studies 
showing a positive relationship between the constructs (e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007), and 
others reporting non-significant outcomes (e.g., Bernheim, 1998). We predict that financial   11
knowledge will be positively related to perceived savings adequacy (i.e., the knowledge 
hypothesis). 
  Finally, in the present investigation one’s level of engagement in financial planning 
activities has been included as a predictor of savings adequacy. Financial planning activities 
can span a wide range of behaviors. They may include information-seeking activities, such as 
reading books or visiting web sites on financial planning, meeting with a financial investment 
counselor, attending a seminar, or participating in a workplace retirement preparation 
program. They may also involve instrumental activities such as gathering, organizing, and 
reviewing one’s financial and investment records, calculating how much will be needed to 
attain a desired standard of living, or ascertaining one’s projected level of pension and social 
security benefits. Lusardi (1999) found heads of households who had not engaged in planning 
activities had accumulated significantly less wealth than households in which the head had 
done some planning, and Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2003) reached similar findings. We 
predict that financial planning will be found to be positively related to perceived savings 
adequacy (i.e., the planning hypothesis) 
In sum, it is believed that three separate groups of factors will be found to be 
influential when it comes to individuals’ retirement saving decisions and perceptions of 
savings adequacy. These include factors that work at the level of the individual, society, and 
societal institutions. On an a priori basis, one would expect that the individual and social 
forces would be more important in cultures that stress individual responsibility in matters of 
retirement. Institutional level factors, in contrast, are expected to be of greater importance in 
societies where retirement savings decisions are made at the collective level. That is, in 
societies in which trust in the institution is paramount. 
 
4. Method and data 
The data were collected in the U.S. and the Netherlands using a core set of identical questions 
that had been back-translated in order to ensure conceptual equivalence. Dutch participants 
were a subset of working individuals 25-64 years of age, drawn from a large national panel 
surveyed in March 2007 by the CentERdata databank at the University of Tilburg. 
CentERdata maintains a representative internet-based panel of 2,000 households in the 
Netherlands.
1 Only one member per household was eligible to participate in the study in order 
to avoid overrepresentation at the household level, and only panel members who had a spouse 
                                                 
1 For more details see http://www.centerdata.nl/en/index.html.   12
or partner at the time of testing were sampled. This latter inclusionary criterion was put in 
place in order to be able to examine the social forces that affect perceived savings adequacy 
within a household. American respondents were also married or partnered working adults 25-
64 years of age, who were surveyed in North Central Oklahoma in March 2007. Beside the 
use of different sampling methodologies used in the two countries, the demographic structure 
of the Dutch and American groups differed primarily in terms of gender (see Table 1). 
Relative to members of the American sample, the Dutch group was slightly underrepresented 
by females; a finding that reflects the relatively low labor market participation of women in 
the Netherlands. 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Five social-demographic indicators were also included in this study—age, gender, self 
reported health status, level of education and perceived income adequacy. Each was measured 
along conventional lines. Level of education was measured by transforming it into effective 
years of education, in order to ensure that educational levels were roughly comparable across 
nations. Health status was included in this set of variables, as some experts have predicted the 
cost of out-of-pocket health care expenses will outstrip the growth in (pension) income. Being 
in good health in old age seems to generate a double dividend; not only will it help individuals 
to save on health care costs, but it may also help older people to engage in home production, 
thereby making ends meet more easily (Skinner, 2007). 
Table 1 also contains mean scores for a number of scales that measure psychological 
and retirement constructs used in the statistical analyses, and Table 2 provides a full 
description of each of those variables. Table 2 also includes a description of scale 
characteristics, a sample item from each measure, and coefficient alpha values that indicate 
the internal consistency of each scale. Items for all five scales used the same 5-point Likert-
type response format. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
One of the central dependent measures in this study—retirement savings adequacy—is based 
on a three-item scale that includes the following questions: 
(1) Do you think you will have enough money to retire comfortably? (see Figure 3a);  
(2) I expect to have a good retirement income (see Figure 3b); and    13
(3) I am saving enough to retire comfortably (see Figure 3c). 
 
FIGURES 3A TO 3D HERE 
 
To facilitate interpretation of the survey and estimation results, we have presented a 
breakdown of scores for each of the three savings adequacy items, as well as the savings 
adequacy full-scale score (Figures 3a to 3d). The levels of disagreement shown in figures 3A 
to 3D provide an impression of the level of undersaving for retirement, whereas levels of 
agreement signal that retirement savings are perceived to be either adequate or more than 
adequate. As indicated in the first two figures, comparable numbers of American and Dutch 
employees have similar feelings about their retirement savings being inadequate. In Figure 3a 
the dissatisfaction rate is approximately 12 percent, and in Figure 3b disagreement levels 
center around 17 percent. What is surprising, in light of the two different pension cultures, is 
that the first two questions suggest American workers are more satisfied with their savings 
than the Dutch. Dutch workers are somewhat more neutral about the assessment of their 
retirement savings. This picture is somewhat corrected in the third question, which gives the 
impression that American and Dutch workers are more or less equally satisfied that they have 
saved enough to retire comfortably (as judged by the percentage agreeing with that 
statement), and far more Americans are dissatisfied with the statement (30 percent 
disagreement level versus 21 percent among the Dutch). In that respect, the full-scale savings 
adequacy scores used in this study provides a more balanced view (see Figure 3d), showing 




5.1 Perceived savings adequacy 
To estimate the effect of the various factors, a step-wise procedure was used. Table 3a and 3b 
present OLS regression estimates for four models designed to account for differences in the 
perceived savings adequacy of American and Dutch workers, respectively. The first model 
uses trust levels in pension institutions as explanatory variables. The second model includes 
social forces as explanatory variables, and the third model include variables reflecting the 
psychological predisposition to save. All three sets of forces—institutional, social and 
psychological—have been incorporated into the fourth model. Because of the linearity of the 
estimation method and the consistent use of five-point rating scales (save the income   14
adequacy question which used a four-point scale) the coefficients are well interpretable. 
Specifically, a coefficient of 0.2 on a five-point scales means that the difference between high 
and low scores for a given predictor will result in a full one point difference in retirement 
savings adequacy. 
 
TABLES 3a and 3b HERE 
 
It becomes immediately apparent upon viewing the regression estimates across countries from 
the pension institution analysis (model I), that one’s trust in pension funds has a far greater 
effect on savings adequacy among Dutch workers than Americans. Relative to a baseline 
model containing only the control variables (not shown), the explained variance estimate in 
the Dutch model almost doubles when the institutional variables are taken into account. The 
baseline model alone explained 20 percent of the variance in savings adequacy, compared to 
39 percent of the variance in the model that also contained the institutional variables. In the 
American case, the increase in explained variance was far smaller: from 29 percent in the 
baseline model to 37 percent in the model containing the institutional variables. 
The picture is not so clear-cut with respect to the model examining the impact of 
social forces on saving adequacy (model II). In both countries support from spouses and other 
players in one’s social network was found to have a significant effect on savings adequacy. 
The effects of parental socialization, however, were small if not altogether absent. Being 
socialized as a child to learn savings lessons is of some importance in the U.S., but the role of 
parents as role models seemed to have little effect on perceptions of savings adequacy. In the 
Netherlands the effects were just the opposite. Socialization as a child seems to matter very 
little, whereas having had parents who served as role models was, at least to a small extent, 
significantly related to retirement savings evaluations. 
Model III contains the set of psychological disposition variables, and it is here that the 
most telling differences emerged between the American and Dutch pension cultures. Future 
time perspective had a very large effect on retirement savings adequacy among American 
workers, whereas the comparable Dutch effect was far smaller. The effect of planning 
activities and financial knowledge were of more or less equal importance in the two countries. 
Whereas this simple (partial) model explained 60 percent of the variation in savings 
perceptions among Americans, it only explained 39 percent of the variability among the 
Dutch. Furthermore, it is striking how in both countries the effects of gender and education 
disappear from the model once the psychological dispositional variables are entered. This   15
suggests, as one might expect, that the accumulation of human capital (education, health) is 
related to a large extent by the same psychological factors that motivate individuals to 
accumulate pension wealth. The same may well apply to gender differences in the 
psychological disposition to save. 
Of course, the best overview of the contribution of the various elements in driving 
savings adequacy is obtained by estimating the full model (model IV). In this analysis, the 
differences between the two cultures really crystallize. What appears to matter most in the 
American setting is the individual pension mind set; in particular, one’s level of future 
orientation and financial planning capabilities. What matters most in the Dutch setting is trust 
in the pension fund that manages the worker’s retirement assets. Interestingly, in the 
Netherlands one’s level of future orientation plays virtually no role in structuring perceptions 
of savings adequacy. It should also be noted that health status and income adequacy were of 
significant importance in the Dutch case. And whereas income adequacy was also important 
among Americans, health status appeared to have no impact on perceptions of saving 
adequacy among those living in the U.S. Finally, education did not seem to matter much in 
terms of accounting for perceived savings adequacy in either country, after the other sets of 
predictors had been entered into the model 
 
5.2 Perceived savings adequacy and replacement rates 
Perceived savings adequacy is assumed to be the outcome of an evaluation that compares 
one’s expected retirement income with the income level believed to be required in order to 
live comfortably. In the Dutch and American surveys we asked respondents not only what 
level of replacement rate they expected to receive in retirement, but also the level of 
replacement rate they needed in order to have a ‘good’ retirement. The “needed” replacement 
question was formulated as follows: ‘Imagine your annual income just before you retire. 
What percentage of that annual amount do you think you would need in order to have a good 
retirement income?’ The expected replacement rate question was formulated as follows: 
‘What percentage of your annual income just prior to retirement do you expect to receive 
after you retire?’  In Table 4, we present an overview of the differences across the two 
countries along these dimensions. It shows a cross tabulation of employees who report 
different degrees of savings adequacy, their expected and needed replacement rates, and the 
gap between expected and needed replacement rates.
2 As seen in the table, the mean needed 
                                                 
2 In Table 4, all reported replacement rate values for the two countries were taken into account. This included a 
small number of very low reported replacement rate values. One could argue that these particularly low values   16
replacement rate is 75.7 in the Netherlands, and 63.7 percent in the U.S. 
  
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Other differences across countries are clearly visible when one looks the replacement rate 
levels in combination with their variance estimates (as measured by the standard deviation). 
Relative to Americans, Dutch workers generate on all levels higher expected replacement 
rates, accompanied by considerably lower levels of variability. In part, the higher amounts of 
variability seen in among members of the American sample presumably stem from the 
uncertainty that surrounds their expected retirement income. Another contributing factor to 
the divergence in variability is that the American system relies to a great extent on individual 
decision making processes, whereas the Dutch pension system is highly centralized. Thus, the 
former would surely be likely to generate a larger spread in replacement rates, and 
accordingly, higher variability estimates. The most surprising result in Table 4, however, is 
that the gaps in replacement rates are more or less identical in both countries. In general, 
workers in the U.S. and the Netherlands who have a high level of perceived savings adequacy 
see a close connection between their expected and needed retirement income (note the very 
small replacement rate gap). This is in strong contrast to those who perceive their savings to 
be inadequate; among these individuals the replacement rate gap in both countries is roughly 
20 percent. 
We then examined the extent to which the expected replacement rate values were 
related to the main determinants of perceived savings adequacy (see Table 5). If the same 
factors that explain perceptions of savings adequacy also explain expected replacement rates, 
then this may indicate that one’s perceptions are driven by the accumulation of wealth, and 
therefore, not simply a matter of  preferences. 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
In this analysis, the most striking difference between the two samples was that again, 
American workers who were actively involved in retirement planning expected far higher 
replacement rates than those who were less involved. In the Netherlands, in contrast, engaging 
                                                                                                                                                         
were the result of financial illiteracy on the part of the respondent, or some other misunderstanding, and 
excluding these low values could change the statistical outcome. A recalculation of the replacement rates results   17
in retirement planning activities did not lead participants to expect a higher replacement rate. 
What did appear to matter in the Netherlands was again, one’s level of trust in the pension 
fund of the employer. Trust in one’s employer pension also mattered among Americans, but 
to a far smaller extent. This may reflect the fact that in the U.S., accumulated savings in 
pension funds are not as extensive as they are in the Netherlands. Interestingly, in both 
countries we found that females expected lower replacement rates than males. 
In sum, the findings from the full model examining expected income replacement rates 
delivered a mixed message. On the one hand, some of the forces that explained perceptions of 
savings adequacy were clearly at work in this analysis.  On the other hand, other new forces 
were found to emerge, and some that had been important in the perceptual analysis were non-
significant when examining expected replacement rates. In other words, this combination of 
findings suggests that perceived savings adequacy is apparently a matter of wealth as well as 
a matter of perception. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Are the lifetime savings people make sufficient to provide them with a comfortable pension 
income? This highly uncertain and subjective aspect of life cycle decision making was 
assessed in 2007 among Dutch and American workers using equivalent forms of a retirement 
pension survey. In the past, these two countries have made markedly different design choices 
regarding their pension systems. The American system relies to a large extent on individual 
responsibility and self-determination, whereas the highly centralized Dutch system—with its 
mandatory enrollment policy—effectively circumvents the problems of procrastination and 
lack of willpower. Our analyses revealed that despite large cross-national differences in 
pension benefit levels and institutional settings, in both countries, about half of respondents 
were confident they had amassed sufficient retirement savings. Additional analyses 
demonstrated that the gap between needed and expected replacement rates were more or less 
equivalent across countries, although the levels of replacement rates differed. The mean value 
of expected and needed replacement rates are 67 and 76 percent of individuals’ pre-retirement 
income in the Netherlands, respectively, and 57 and 64 percent in the U.S. 
  We also found that individuals’ perceived savings adequacy was influenced by three 
different groups of factors: institutional forces, psychological dispositions and social forces. 
Beginning with the latter, social interactions at the micro level proved to be significant 
                                                                                                                                                         
after first having excluded all values lower than 30 percent has been carried out (available upon request from the 
authors). The general conclusions with respect to cross-national differences remained robust.   18
predictors of perceptions of savings adequacy. However, the overall impact of the social force 
dimensions was limited. Spousal support for retirement saving was of some importance 
among Americans, whereas for the Dutch, perceptions of savings adequacy were influenced 
by the socializing force of parents as role models. 
  The primary determinants of perceived savings adequacy were identified to be a 
combination of institutional characteristics and psychological forces. The extent to which 
individuals express confidence in various pension institutions—such as employer pension 
funds, banks and insurance companies—was clearly related to perceived savings adequacy. 
Trust in the government to provide an adequate public pension, in contrast, was not found to 
be significantly related to this outcome variable. Respondents’ mean level of trust in employer 
pension funds and the government was found to differ across countries, with the Dutch 
reporting a higher level of confidence in these two institutions than Americans. Moreover, the 
positive relationship found between trust in one’s employer pension and perceived savings 
adequacy was also much stronger among the Dutch. It is unclear, however, whether these 
levels of institutional trust will remain stable over time, and the extent to which future policy 
changes would cause these trust levels to wax or wane. 
The incorporation of psychological forces into our models clearly helped to explain 
why it is that individuals plan and save for retirement. In both countries, financial knowledge 
was found to be positively related to perceptions of retirement savings adequacy. Individual 
differences in the mind set of American workers, however, played a far larger role in 
explaining differences in savings adequacy than it did in the Netherlands. Perhaps the most 
interesting psychological outcome involved the future orientation dimension. The average 
level of future orientation was not only stronger in the U.S., but it was also more strongly 
related to perceptions of savings adequacy than it was among the Dutch. These two findings 
serve to underscore the important role of psychological forces when it comes to saving 
patterns within the American system. For the Dutch, perceived savings adequacy was found to 
be unrelated to one’s level of future time perspective. The Dutch were not only less future 
oriented than the Americans, but more importantly, their perception of future retirement 
income was unrelated to their orientation to time. In other words, thinking about the future 
and saving for retirement are two separate issues in the Netherlands, whereas these issues are 
clearly linked in the US. 
  Our analyses suggest that elements of institutional settings and pension designs can 
have an appreciable impact on an individual’s pension mindset. That being the case, public 
policy makers and pension designers need to be cautious in instituting broad-based changes,   19
as radical reforms may not generate the intended effects. For example, privatizing a state-
based pension system in a country where workers are not accustomed to making their own 
retirement savings decisions could result in a larger spread of replacement rates, because 
many individuals will be ill-prepared to effectively deal with policy regime changes. In such a 
case, a privatization plan could backfire due to either adverse selection processes or the 
inability of individuals to adjust to the norms and attitudes that are part and parcel of a 
privatized pension culture. On the other hand, the findings from this study suggest that 
establishing a paternalistic institutional design—effectively the opposite of a privatized 
scheme—may conflict with individuals’ freedom of choice, and thus, perceptions of control in 
designing their own future life course. Opting for a paternalistic system may also serve to 
reduce future orientation levels, which may well impinge on other intertemporal decisions 
such as investing for health and education. Thus, those involved in formulating pension 
reforms face a double-edged sword when attempting to foresee the long-range impact of their 
decisions. 
This study is not without its limitations.  Although our data were collected with the 
intention of examining cross-national differences in pension savings adequacy, the sample of 
American respondents were not nationally representative. In addition, cross-sectional data 
were used, which limit some of the causal conclusions that can be drawn, and some of the 
items were measured by single-item indicators. There are, nevertheless, several strengths to 
this investigation.  Perhaps the most significant strength involved the incorporation of three 
qualitatively different types of forces into a single analytical framework. This is an important 
contribution to the empirical literature, which in the past has focused on the impact of one or 
two sets of forces, and then usually only in one country. This brings us to the second strength.  
This study has focused on two countries with markedly different pension cultures with 
different norms and institutions. It turns out that the cultural context – as embedded in 
institutions and social norms – but also the psychological disposition of individual actors are 
pivotal in understanding pension perceptions and expectations and most likely subsequent 
behavior. This has significant implications for pension reforms since it suggests that their 
success will strongly depend on the specific cultural context in which they are implemented. 
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Figure 1: U.S. personal savings rate (as a percentage of personal disposable income), 
January 1959-February 2008 
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Figure 2: Personal savings rate, voluntary and contractual savings in the Netherlands,  
1970-2007 
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Figures 3a-d: Scores for the three perceived savings adequacy items as well as the 
constructed full-scale score. 
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Table 1: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) on Variables for the 
Dutch and American Samples 
 American  Dutch 
Sample size  524 519 
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(a) The sample sizes for the replacement rate variables are 515 (US) and 517 (Dutch).  
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Table 2: Scale Characteristics, Psychometric Properties, and Wording of Survey Items for the Psychological and Retirement Variables 
 
Scale/Variable Name and Source 
 




Trust in Government  To what extent do you trust the government to manage your 
future pension (answer categories 1= no confidence at all; 
5= a lot of confidence) 
n.a. 
Trust in Banks/Insurance companies  To what extent do you trust banks and insurance companies  
to manage your future pension (answer categories 1= no 
confidence at all; 5= a lot of confidence) 
n.a. 
Quality of Employer pension  My employer provides a good pension plan (1 = strongly 
disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
n.a. 
Health status  How do you consider your health in general? (1=very good; 
2 = good; 3 =fair; 4 = poor; 5 = very poor) 
n.a. 
Income adequacy  To what extent can you manage with your current household 
income? (1= with great difficulty; 2 =  with some difficulty;  
3 = easily; 4 = very easily) 
n.a. 
Socialization as a child  Saving was a lesson I learned as a child (1 = strongly 
disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
n.a. 
Parents as role models  My parents did a good job of planning and saving for their 
own retirement (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
n.a. 
Support from spouse 
2-item scale. A single score for this measure was constructed 
by calculating an unweighted mean. Higher scores correspond 
to higher spousal support 
(1) My spouse believes it’s important to save for retirement 
(2) My spouse is indifferent about saving for retirement (1 = 
strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
American α = .76 
Dutch α = .66 
Support from friends and coworkers 
2-item scale. A single score for this measure was constructed 
by calculating an unweighted mean. Higher scores correspond 
to higher friend and coworker support 
(1) My friends believe it’s important to save for retirement 
(2) My colleagues at work believe it’s important to save for 
retirement (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
American α = .76 
Dutch α = .44  29
 
Future time perspective 
4-item scale. A single score for this measure was constructed 
by calculating an unweighted mean. Higher scores correspond 
to longer future time perspectives. 
(1) I enjoy thinking about how I will live years from now in 
the future. (2) I follow the advice to save for a rainy day. (3) 
The distant future is too uncertain to plan for.  (4) I pretty 
much live on a day-to-day basis (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = 
strongly agree) 
American α = .69 
Dutch α = .65 
Perceived financial knowledge 
3-item scale. Higher scores correspond to higher levels of 
perceived financial knowledge. 
(1) I know more than most people about retirement 
planning. (2) I am very uninformed about financial planning 
for retirement. (3) When I have a need for financial services, 
I know exactly where to obtain information on what to do. (1 
= strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) 
American α = .85 
Dutch α = .79 
Retirement planning activity 
3-item scale. Higher scores correspond to more planning 
activities. 
(1) Calculations have been made to estimate how much 
money I need to save to retire comfortably (2) I have 
informed myself about the level of my future pension 
benefits. (3) I have informed myself about financial 
preparation for retirement. (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = 
strongly agree) 
American α = .88 
Dutch α = .79 
Perceived retirement savings adequacy 
3-item indicator.  Higher scores correspond to higher levels of 
perceived savings adequacy. 
(1) I am saving enough to retire comfortably. (2) I expect a 
good retirement income (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly 
agree), and (3) Do you think you will have enough money to 
retire comfortably (1= no, certainly not; 5 = yes, certainly) 
 
American α = .83 
Dutch α = .74 
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Table 3a: Regression analyses explaining the perceived retirement savings adequacy of American workers 
(N=524)  
 
Explaining: adequacy of retirement savings 





Pension Institutions  Social Forces  Psychological Dispositions  Full Model 
Background factors
 a              
    Age  -0.00  (0.72)  -0.01*  (2.12)  -0.01**  (4.59)  -0.01**  (4.82) 
    Sex (male = 0)  -0.14*  (2.14)  -0.18**  (3.04)  -0.07  (1.39)  -0.08  (1.57) 
    Health status  -0.18**  (4.72)  -0.14**  (3.86)  -0.07*  (2.18)  -0.05  (1.79) 
    Years of education  0.03*  (2.12)  0.03* (2.22)  0.01  (1.28)  0.01 (0.86) 
    Income adequacy  0.48**  (10.14)          0.41**  (8.96)  0.26**  (6.57)  0.21**  (5.29) 
                
Trust in pension institutions                
Government   -0.02  (0.77)  -  -  -  -  -0.00  (0.17) 
Employer’s pension fund
  0.17**  (6.94)  -  -  -  -  0.09**  (4.81) 
Banks/insurance companies  0.11**  (3.47)  -  -  -  -  0.07**  (2.74) 
                
Social forces               
Spousal support  -  -       0.23**  (7.19)  -  -  0.12**  (4.73) 
Support from colleagues and friends  -  -       0.21**  (5.02)  -  -  0.03  (0.86) 
Learned to save as a child  -  -       0.10**  (3.59)  -  -  0.01  (0.48) 
Parents as role model  -  -  -0.03  (1.05)      0.02  (0.81) 
               
Psychological forces               
Future time perspective  -  -  -  -  0.30**  (7.94)  0.24**  (6.45) 
Retirement  planning  - -  - -  0.24**  (5.95)  0.21**  (5.41) 
Perceived financial knowledge  -  -  -  -  0.17**  (4.33)  0.14**  (3.69) 
          
Constant 1.18**  (4.28)  0.50  (1.75)  0.77**  (3.42)  0.19  (0.81) 
Adjusted  R²  0.37 0.42 0.60 0.64 
 
Note: Absolute t values are stated in parentheses; * Significant at p <0.05; ** Significant at p <0.01 
(a) The explanatory power of a model (as measured by the adjusted R²) with only the background variables is 0.29 31
Table 3b: Regression analyses explaining the perceived retirement savings adequacy of Dutch workers (N=519) 
Explaining: adequacy of retirement savings 





Pension Institutions  Social Forces  Psychological Dispositions  Full Model 
              
Background factors 
a              
    Age  0.01**  (2.80)  0.00  (1.48) 0.00  (0.94)  0.01*  (1.99) 
    Sex (male = 0)  -0.15**  (2.71)  -0.23**  (3.83)  -0.09  (1.50)  -0.07  (1.42) 
    Health status  -0.20**  (4.65)  -0.18**  (3.85)  -0.19**  (4.32)  -0.17**  (4.29) 
    Years of education  0.03*  (2.37)  0.03** (2.71)  0.03*  (2.82)  0.02* (2.30) 
    Income adequacy  0.23**  (6.07)          0.29**  (7.07)  0.25**  (6.50)  0.19**  (5.41) 
                
Trust in pension institutions                
Government 0.04  (1.42)  -  -  -  -  0.03  (1.07) 
Employer’s pension fund
  0.29**  (11.41)  -  -  -  -  0.24**  (9.87) 
Banks/insurance companies  0.07*  (2.35)  -  -  -  -  0.05*  (1.95) 
                
Social forces                 
Spousal support  -  -       0.08**  (2.52)  -  -  0.02  (0.75) 
Support from colleagues and friends  -  -       0.20**  (4.02)  -  -  0.02  (0.50) 
Learned to save as a child  -  -   0.04  (1.23)  -  -  0.02  (0.80) 
Parents as role model  -  -       0.07**  (2.80)  -  -  0.06**  (2.85) 
                
Psychological forces                 
Future time perspective  -  -  -  -  0.09*  (2.23)  0.07  (1.78) 
Retirement  planning  - -  - -  0.21**  (7.44)  0.15**  (5.80) 
Perceived financial knowledge  -  -  -  -  0.19**  (5.31)  0.15**  (4.65) 
          
Constant 0.94**  (3.48)  0.94**  (3.03) 0.96** (3.57)  -0.02  (0.07) 
Adjusted  R²  0.39 0.28 0.39 0.51 
 
Note: Absolute t values are stated in parentheses; * Significant at p <0.05; ** Significant at p <0.01 
(a) The explanatory power of a model (as measured by the adjusted R²) with only the background variables is 0.20   32
 
Table 4: Savings adequacy and mean replacement rates
 – American versus Dutch 
samples (standard deviations in parentheses) 
 






























































Note: The expected replacement rate value is based on the question: ‘What percentage of your annual income 
just prior to retirement do you expect to receive after you retire?’ The needed replacement rate was based on the 
question: ‘Imagine your annual income just before you retire.  What percentage of that annual amount do you 
think you would need in order to have a good retirement income?’ 
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Table 5: Explaining expected income replacement rates, American versus Dutch 
workers 
  Expected retirement replacement rate 
  American Workers  Dutch Workers 
Explanatory variables  Coefficient t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
Background factors        
    Age  0.10  1.03  -0.03  0.36 
    Sex (male = 0)  -4.18*  2.04  -4.86**  2.91 
    Health status  0.38  1.26  -2.88*  2.28 
    Years of education  0.20  0.46  -0.29  0.91 
    Income adequacy  1.66  1.67  0.27  0.23 
Trust in pension institutions        
Government   1.67  1.78  -0.71  0.85 
Employer pension  2.16**  2.65  4.47**  5.71 
Banks/insurance companies  1.92  1.81  0.23  0.26 
Social forces        
Spousal support  -0.22  0.20  -1.05  1.15 
Support from colleagues and friends  -0.98  0.66  0.61  0.44 
Learned to save as a child  -1.72  1.85  -1.20  1.51 
Parents as role models  0.76  0.93  1.33*  1.96 
Psychological forces        
Future time perspective  2.72  1.73  0.73  0.56 
Retirement planning  5.01**  3.04  1.14  1.32 
Perceived financial knowledge  -1.41  0.88  0.34  0.33 
Constant 14.77  1.49  60.17**  6.94 
Adjusted R
2 0.13  0.10 
N =   515  517 
 